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2. Neoclassical labor economics: its implications for 
labor and employment law 
Michael L. Wachter1 
The applica tion of economics to labor and employment law tra il s it s applicat io n in vir-
tually all o ther areas of business and commercial law. Topics such as contracts , tort s, 
corpora tions, commercial law, and tax have all readily integrated economic reasoning as 
an ass ist to lega l reasoning. In almost all these cases. moreover. the economics concept 
of efficiency has been accepted as one of the goals of the law. This is decidedly not the 
case in labor law or, for the most part, in employment law.c Disagreement over funda-
men tal principles serves as an important explanation fo r thi s relative lack of emphas is on 
. . 
econom1c reasonmg. 
M ost labor law schola rs believe deeply that collective bargaining is the preferred 
framework for the employment relationship . 3 They tend to share the origina l goal of the 
National Labor Rela tions Act (NLRA), which remains on the books toda y, of equal-
izing bargaining power by enabling workers to engage in co llective bargaining with 
their employers. The NLRA's goal of equalizing bargaining power encompassed both 
procedural and substantive ends: it sought to promo te the mechanism of collective bar-
gaining and , in doing so, to raise 1mges above the market 1mge tha t would prevail absent 
unio nizat ion. 
Achieving both procedural and substantive ends simultaneo usly turned o ut to be the 
cha llenge. As unio ns helped workers gain a wage premium. unionized firms became less 
competitive and nonunion firms fought harder to stay nonunion. Modern neoclass i-
cal economic theory offered a simple explanation based on the m ost basic principle o f 
economics . The inverse relationship between quantit y (i.e ., employment) and price (i.e., 
wage), works in the labor market as in every other market. If unions succeed in raising 
wages above competitive levels by using the eco nomic weapo ns available to them in col-
lective ba rgaining, unio n employment is likely to suffer. The res ult is a tradeoff between 
the number of wo rkers covered by collective ba rga ining agreements and the size of the 
union wage premium. As a consequence there is an inconsistency within this goal of the 
N LRA. 
Several a ttempts have been made to formulate a lternative theorie s that era se thi s 
dismal tradeo ff between the size of the unionized wo rkforce and the union wage 
p remium in order to resuscitate the twin goals of high union employment and a higher 
union wage. M ost varia nts a re built around the efficiency model. Workers are not like 
o ther commodities or inp uts in that they can respond to incentives. Perhaps higher wages 
cou ld call forth greater cooperation and higher productivity. To date, however, this line 
o r research bas no t been successful in res uscita ting the normative appea l for the union 
sector because its assumptions only hold for the nonunion secto r. 
Research has moved beyond this threshold issue to o ther labor market issues, par-
ticu la rl y those ar ising in the internal labor market , or, in other words, the employment 
20 
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relationship that exists inside the firm. Here workers are less mobile and the firm is less 
constrained by market force s. Conseq uently, there is at least potentially greater room for 
policy intervention that would improve the protectio n accorded to workers. Even here , 
however, economic theory which emphasizes the transaction costs of collective bargain-
ing otTers more caveats than encouragement. The lack of integration of economics into 
labor and employment law is thus not surprising at a ll. If one's agenda is to promote 
collective bargaining or provide more procedural right s to nonunion employees, 
neoclassical economics is no t a promising starting po int. 
The task of this chapter is to analyze the tradeoff between wages and employment and 
to eval ua te other policies and policy prescriptions in the context of a neoclassical m odel 
of the labor market . That model is different from the simplified textbook portrayal. 
Yet it is not new, as its basic building blocks have been availab le for several decades. 
For example , portions of this chapter are drawn from two articles that I co-authored 
(Wachter and Wright, 1990; Rock and Wachter, 1996), citing to the original articles that 
developed the concepts. 
The chapter is organized in the following sections. Section I describes the foundations 
of the neoclassical model. starting with the textbook model of the union and nonunion 
labor markets . These are the external labor market s (ELM) where workers seek jobs 
and employers fill vacancies. This section presents the core issue; namely the tradeoff 
between union wages and union employment. It then explores the fundamental theo -
rems of welfare economics that allow us to attach welfare implications to alternative 
market outcomes and investigates the various theoretical attempts to refute the existence 
of the tradeoff between union wages and employment. Section II develops the model 
of the internal labor markets (ILM), which represents the employment re lationsh ip 
inside the firm. It a lso presents the connections between the ILM and the ELM and 
presents the four central economic factors in the ILM ; namely job-specific training, risk 
a version, information asymmetries and transaction costs. Sections III and IV discuss 
how the parties deal with the four factor s of the ILM either thro ugh union contracting 
(Sect ion III) or nonunion contracting or norms (Section IV) . The last section, Section V, 
concludes the chapter and discusses policy implications. 
I. FOUNDATIONS OF THE NEOCLASSICAL MODEL 
A. Textbook Model of a Competitive Labor Market 
I start with the simple competitive equilibrium textbook model of the labor market 
(see Figure 2.1). Although simple, it is a ll that is needed to engage much of the debate. 
This is the external labor market (ELM), where firm s hire workers into new jobs and 
unemployed workers search for jobs after an existing job turnover or an entry into the 
labor market. The key prediction is that wages are determined by market forces, labor 
supply (denoted by S), and labor demand (denoted by D). Market-equilibrating forces 
lead the labor market toward the equilibrium so lu tion. where S and D intersect. with 
employment at Ec and the wage at W c At thi s point wages cannot be higher without 
employment being lower. The equilibrium point is thus efficient 4 
Suppose. however, that the labor market were out of equi lib rium. with a low wage of 
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Figure 2.1 Competitive labor market 
W L (where the subscript L denotes the low wage) . At this low wage level, demand for 
labor (DL) wo uld be far in excess o f the suppl y of labor (SL). Since labor markets are 
competitive, employers would offer higher wages to compete for wo rkers in order to fill 
the high demand for labor. Wages would rise toward W C' and the labor suppl y would 
increase as more individuals joined the labor force seeking jo bs a t the higher wage levels. 
At the same time, labor demand would begin to decline because the higher pay of the 
work force would mean that workers were less profitable. Thus the equilibrating process 
wo uld continue until the wage had increased from W L to W c and demand had decl ined 
from DL to the competitive equilibrium level of empl oyment (deno ted by Ec)· 
Alternatively, suppose the labor market we re out of equilibrium with a high wage of 
W w At this point labor demand wo uld be at DH. which would be much lower than the 
suppl y SH. Market-equilibrating forces wo uld again come into opera tio n. Now workers 
would compete for the jobs at the high wage rate . As a consequence of the labor co mpe-
tition. the wage rate wo uld begin to decline. As the wage declined, employment would 
begin to pick up, reflecting the lower wage ra te . The process would continue until the 
wage had declined to W c and emplo yment had increased to Ec 
The above discussion oflab or supply and demand presents a partial equilibrium view . 
Labor suppl y and demand functi ons fit into a st ructural model of the overall economy. 
In the structural model, wage effec ts ripple thro ugh other markets and in turn feed back 
to influence the location of the labor supply and demand curve . 
The labor demand curve discussed above is referred to as a deri ved demand because 
it is derived from the demand for the firm's products. The location of the demand curve 
depends on the productivity and skill of workers in producing the product or service that 
the employer is selling in the market. The greater the productivity of workers, the greater 
is the equilibrium wage . Demand curves slope downwa rd because of substitution effec ts 
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a nd diminishing ret urn s as consumers switch away from expensive prod ucts and employ-
ers substitute inexpensive factors of production fo r expensive factors. At this leve l of 
abstraction the diagram refers to the overall labor market; however it can be generalized 
to any number of different skill levels and geographical regions. This discussion assumes 
the existence of competitive la bor ma rkets. 
The supply curve 's location depend s on the work/leisure choice made by individuals. 
Supply curves are genera lly viewed as being upward sloping; that is, more individuals 
enter the labor market in search of jobs when the wage is high . H owever. whereas the 
demand curve is a lways downward sloping, the supply curve need not always be upward 
sloping. For the purposes of thi s chapter. I ass ume the labor supply is upward sloping, 
but no thing of importance in the chapter turns on this assumption. 
It is the existence of an inverse relationship between wages and empl oyment that is at 
the heart of the debate . There a re some changes in the economy, such as an expansion-
ary moneta ry and fi scal policy in the midst of a recession, that ca n allow employment 
to increase even as wages are increased. But changes of this type are not contested . The 
debatable iss ue is a very speciftc one . namely whether an exogenous increase in union 
wages above the market-clea ring wage, as a result o f collect ive bargaining, will have a 
negative effect on union employment. Deconstructing the wage/employment tradeo ff 
thus becomes critical for traditional labor scholars who wa nt to undo the claim that 
higher union wages are inversely related to union empl oyment levels. 5 
In this chapter I assume, as do most other economists, that external labor markets 
in the nonunion sector are gene rally highly competitive. I do no t ass ume that product 
markets are necessarily competitive nor do I a ssume tha t internal labor markets are 
perfectly competitive . Although the tex tbook model above assumes perfect compe-
tition, perfect ion is not needed for the efficiency and welfare co nclusions to ho ld. 
Labor markets that are highly competitive, but not perfectly so. can have frictions a nd 
info rmation gaps a t any point in time, and can be in disequilibrium in the short run . 
None of the policy conclusions is changed by acknowledging these short-run m arket 
imperfections. 
The model I use here, the neocla ss ica l theory, is the standa rd model used in economic 
ana lysis. It can be criticized for igno ring many instituti onal features of the labor market , 
but its goa l is tes table predictio ns. And that it does with excellence. Wages do generally 
ri se a t a fas ter rate during expansions and decrease or rise a t a slower rate during reces-
sions. M ore skilled workers will generally have higher wages than less skilled workers. 
Growing regions will tend to have fa ster wage growth than declining regions. There are 
discrepancies, of course, because no theo ry is perfect. but the overall predictive picture is 
strong. Moreover~ and this is key- there is no a lte rnat ive theory which offers a similar 
range of predictions. Certainly there are many variants of the neoclassical model, but al l 
share the assumption that prices and quantities are determined in markets by press ures 
of suppl y and demand . Moreover, whenever markets are ou t of equilibr ium, there are 
eq uilibra ting forces that push the market toward equi li brium. The equilibra ti on is not 
insta ntaneo us and it can even take years to recalibrate, as was the case in the early 20th 
century, where workers from the so uthern regions of the U nited States moved north in 
search of newly crea ted man ufact uring jobs. 
Anot her key component of the neoclassical m odel consists of the fundamental genera l 
eq uilibrium theorems. The fir st fundamen ta l theorem, stated in its most sim ple fo rm. 
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says tha t competitive markets are efficient because they maximize the total income that 
the economy can produce. 6 The second fundamental theo rem, again in its simplest form, 
is that there are many different income-maximizing states, each corresponding to a differ-
ent distribution of income across individuals. 7 The government, through tax and expen-
diture policies, is given the job of choosing among the alternative income-maximizing 
states to determine the welfare-maximizing income distributio n. The policy implication 
drawn fr om these theorems is that policymakers should first attempt to make markets 
as competitive as possible, and then should seek to improve income distribution to reach 
the optimal distribution of income or we lfare. 
A number of interesting. a lbeit highl y stylized , policy implications can be drawn from 
the above description of the labo r market. First, there is no need for government policy 
(or for unions) to ensure that wages rise over time with worker productivity. Competitive 
markets will lead to tha t result. Instead , if unions ra ise wages above competitive levels, 
the economy will be less productive. Second, when changes in the income distribution 
are deemed desirable, they should genera lly be achieved through tax and government 
expenditure programs rather than by dictating noncompetitive outcomes in markets 
through government regulation. Industrial policy should be confined to making markets 
as competitive as possible. 8 Thus po licies that improve the efficiency of particular labor 
ma rkets are generally fa vo red in neoclassical economics. 
Altho ugh no one believes tha t markets are perfectly efficient , the neoclassical text-
book model assumes that markets are perfectly competitive as a simplifying assumption 
(Ehrenberg and Smith, 20 11 ) and as an ideal against which policy improvements can be 
judged. N otably, over the last seve ral decades neoclassical models have incorporated 
job-search frictions, job-specific training, information asymmetries. and other market 
realities that might a llow fo r policy improvements. 
The neoclassical model has a lso been extended to account for monopsony, in which 
one firm can exercise labor market power. ~ Unlike in the competiti ve labor market , in 
which firm s are ''wage takers'' when they hire workers, in the monopsony model the firm 
is a wage setter. It needs to raise it s wage if it wants to increase hiring and can lower its 
wage when it is reducing employment . I will not illustrate this model o r discuss it in any 
detail , however, because there is little evidence of material monopsony power in U.S. 
labor markets so that whatever monopsony power exists is unlikely to change any o f the 
conclusions reached in this chapter. If monopsony were dominant in the labor market, 
higher union wages could lead to higher employment. 
Labor markets tend to be mo re competitive than product markets. The reason is that 
employers , regardless of their product market, still hire workers from the same externa l 
labo r market. Prospective workers ha ve no firm- specific tra ining and their skill level 
depends mainly on their leve l of education and general training, whether they are high 
school graduates, co llege graduates. or professional school graduates. If employers are 
hiring locally, then each would hire blue-co llar workers from the same high schools and 
entry-level engineers or managers from the same colleges. In o ther wo rds, even if labor 
markets were entirely loca l, they wou ld be more competitive than the loca l product 
markets. However, labor markets are no t local. While workers incur costs in moving 
from one locality to another in sea rch o fjob s, in today's society labo r markets are m ore 
nationa l than local. 
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says that competitive markets are efficient beca use they maximize the total income that 
the economy can produce.6 The second fundamenta l theore m, again in its simplest form, 
is that there are many different income-maximizing states. each corresponding to a diffe r-
ent distribution of income across individual s. 7 The government, through tax and expen-
diture policies, is given the job of choosing among the alternative income-maximizing 
sta tes to determine the welfare-maximizing income distribution. The policy implication 
drawn from these theorems is that policymakers should first attempt to make markets 
as competiti ve as possible, and then should seek to improve income distribution to reach 
the optimal distribution of income or welfare . 
A number of interesting, albeit highly stylized. policy implications can be drawn from 
the above description of the labor market. First , there is no need for government policy 
(or for unions) to ensure that wages rise over time with worker productivity. Competitive 
marke ts will lead to that result. Instead, if unions raise wages above competitive levels, 
the eco nomy will be less productive . Second, when changes in the income distributi on 
are deemed desira ble. they should generally be achieved through tax and government 
expenditure programs rather than by dictating noncompetitive o utco mes in markets 
through government regulation . Industrial policy sho uld be confined to making markets 
as competitive as possible.8 Thus policies that improve the efficiency o f pa rticular la bor 
markets are generally favored in neoclassical economics. 
Although no one believes that markets are perfectly efficient, the neoclassical text-
book model assumes that markets are perfectly competiti ve as a simplifying assumption 
(Ehrenberg and Smith , 2011) and as an idea l against which policy improvements can be 
judged . Notably, over the last several decades neoclass ical model s have incorpora ted 
job-search frictions, job-specific training, information asymmetries. and other market 
rea lities that might a llow for policy improvements. 
The neoclassica l model has a lso been extended to acco unt for m onopso ny, in which 
one firm can exercise labor market power.Y Unlike in the competitive labor market, in 
which firms are "wage takers" when they hire workers, in the monopso ny model the firm 
is a wage setter. It needs to raise its wage if it wants to increase hiring and can lower its 
wage when it is reducing employment. I wi ll no t illustra te this model o r discuss it in any 
deta il , however, because there is little evidence of material monopsony power in U.S. 
labor markets so that whatever monopsony powe r exists is unlikely to change any of the 
conclusions reached in this chapter. If monopsony were dominant in the labor market , 
higher union wages co uld lead to higher employment. 
La bor markets tend to be more competitive than product markets. The reason is that 
employers, regardless of their product market. still hire workers from the same external 
labor market. Prospective workers have no firm- specific training and their skill level 
depends mainly on their level of education and general training, whether they are high 
school graduates, college graduates, or profess ional schoo l graduates. If employers are 
hiring locally, then each would hire blue-collar workers from the same high schools and 
entry-level engineers or managers from the same colleges. In other word s, even if labor 
markets were entirely local, they would be more competitive than the local product 
ma rkets. H owever , labor markets are no t local. While workers incur costs in moving 
from one loca lity to another in search ofj obs, in today's society la bor markets are more 
na tional than loca l. 
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B. Textbook Model of a Union Labor Market 
The primary goal of labor unions is to '· take wages out of competition. " Labor is not 
just another commodity and. in this line of reasoning, workers should not be treated as 
a commodity and have their pay determined by market forces. A key question for labor 
economics is what consequences wi ll follow union efforts to rai se wages above what the 
market would otherwise dic tate. 
The textbook union labor market uses a simple variant of the supply and demand 
model used in Figure 2. 1. Figure 2.2 starts by duplicating the wage and employment 
levels that exist in a competitive market. As noted above, the equilibrating forces of 
competitive markets push the labor market toward the intersection of the S and D 
curves. The union market works very differently because the equilibrating market forces 
are replaced by the collective bargaining mechanism. The wage set through collective 
bargaining, denoted W u• is higher than the market-clea ring, or competitive, wage, W c 
With its legally protected strike weapon, the union can extract a wage premium from 
employers in return for not strikin g. 
As a result of the higher union wage, firm s set labor demand at D u. The societal cost 
of the union wage being higher than the competitive wage is a lower level of employment 
(E L. rather than Ec) . Furthermore. at the higher union wage, not only does the number 
of jobs decrease, but the number of workers seeking those jobs increases. The result 
is unemployment. measured by the horizontal distance a t W u between the supply of 
workers to the union sector, Su, compared to labor demand , D u. Without the equilibrat-
ing force of competitive markets the resulting social loss of reduced output and higher 
unemployment can persist in the union labor market. 10 
The union labor market is sometimes referred to as a cartelized market in that the 
union as the agent of the wo rkers allows labor (workers or suppliers of labor) to act in 
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Figure 2.2 The union market 
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co ncert so that the wage is set above competiti ve levels (Posner, 1984; Wachter, Chapter 
15 in this volume). From an economics vantage point, there is no thing con troversial 
about calling the unionized labor market a cartelized market. The use of the term sim ply 
fit s the economic definition of a cartel. Since cartels in product markets, however, are 
generally viewed nega tively, the term cartel may have acq uired nega tive connotations. 
Its use here, however. is entirely descriptive . Ca rtels seek to take prices. or in thi s case 
wages, out of competi tion, and that is perhaps the best single sentence sta ting unions' 
broad economic goal. 11 
The problem for the union sector is to maintain the cartel and prevent the equili-
brating market forces from operating. This was a more likely event under the original 
Wagner Act, which favo red unionizationlc After the Taft-Hartley Act was passed it 
became easier fo r nonunion firms to form , remain nonunion, and thus compete. using 
their lower labor cost structure, with the unionized firms. The result was the growth of 
nonunion sectors in virtually all United States product ma rkets. The emergence of inter-
national competition has only worsened an a lready bad situation for unions (Wachter , 
Chapter l 5 in th is volume). 13 
In terms of F igure 2.2, this shift of work from the union sector to the nonunion secto r 
means tha t the labor demand curve shifts gradually to the left over time, resulting in 
steadily declining union employment . The union firm can either lower its product price 
to the nonunion price (to the detriment of profits) or try to maintain a price premium to 
cover the union wage. In either case, the union firm is likely to cut employment as it loses 
market share. Where the competition is greates t, the unionized fim1 is unlikely to earn a 
competit ive return on its capital so that it is unlikely to continue to invest in updating it s 
capital eq uipment in its high cost plants. As its capital becomes obsolete, the plants' pro-
duction becomes uncompetitive so that output falls , causing a continuing erosion in union 
em ployment (Linneman , Wachter, and Carter, 1990; Hirsch, Chapter 4 in thi s volume). 
Un ion wage se ttin g in the labor market does not repeal product market press ures: 
wages are no t actually taken out of competition in competitive prod uct markets. The 
extent of the unio n wage premium, which is the percentage difference between W c and 
W C' will affect the fortunes of the firm , and if there are non union firm s in the same 
product market, the union firm will be disadvantaged. That is invaria bly the case today: 
there are esse ntia lly no product markets that lack a nonunion sector. 
One of the explicit goals of the Wagner Act was to equalize barga ining power. As 
Wachter (Chapter 15 in this volume) points out , the substantive element of that goal 
was to push the co llec tively bargained wage higher than the market wage. If the Wagner 
Act had a lso succeeded in the procedural element of that goal of spreading unionizatio n 
throughout the eco nomy, then the general equilibrium res ult of uni onization wo uld be 
not only to raise wages through out the economy, but also to generate unempl oyment. 
The res ult s wo uld be akin to those shown in Figure 2.2. 
The framers of the Wagner Act did not anticipa te that the goa l of raisi ng wages 
above ma rket levels and increasing union employment at the same time wo uld prove 
to be inconsistent. The neoclassical economic model was not developed enough during 
the 1930s for it to be a useful policy tool. The three components of the theory not 
ava ilable to commenta tors in the 1930s were, first , a partia l eq uilibrium theo ry of the 
labor market: seco nd. a genera l equilibrium theory that pointed out the efficiency ga ins 
achieved by compet itive outcomes; and third , a business cycle model. 
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The partial equilibrium theory of the labor market, which posit s that labor demand 
moves inversely with the wage rate, was first sketched out by M arshall (1 890) 14 at the 
turn of the last century, but its complete statement awaited the work of Sir Jo hn Hicks. 
Although Hicks· book was published in 1932, 15 Hicks was a 28 year old, hardly known 
budding sta r at the time. Co nsequently, the theory did not make its way out of univer-
sity communities until the 1940s and it is not clear what Congress believed to be the 
appropriate microeconomic theory to use in evaluating the effect of an increase in wages 
resulting from collective bargaining. 
Since the competit ive wage was not a well -understood concept , it is fair to believe 
that the theory adopted by Congress may have been more one of Commons than of 
Hicks . Commons, one of the great labor economist s of his time, thought that unem-
ployment would be a constant problem and that , absent either government intervention 
or collective ba rga ining, the unemployed wo uld bid down wages until they were at or 
immediately below a living wage (Commons and Andrews, 1927). 
Until the advent of the modern neocla ss ical theory of labor markets. there was little 
support for the notion tha t society co uld be wealthy enough to generate a derived 
demand for la bor that, in intersectio n with labo r supply, would generate a nd mainta in a 
socia lly acceptable wage. Yes, real wages had risen substantia lly over time in the 1800s, 
and took off with the industrial revolution. But a series of cyclical crises cu lmina ting in 
the Great Depression suggested an unpleasant dyna mic story that capi talism was prone 
to excess competiti on which wo uld inevitably generate depress io ns and " reserve a rmies" 
of unemployed workers. If the Great D epression had been the story of the future, then 
Commons rather than Hicks might still be taught in Econ 1. 
The economic inefficiency of cartels was also largely unknown at the drafting of the 
NLRA. Showing that unio ns may ca use unemployment in one market does not neces-
sarily pro ve that the economy is worse off. Adam Smith (1 776) conjectured tha t that was 
true in 1776, a nd Leon Walras (1874) developed the initial theory for it (ifyou could read 
French) ; but it was not until the 1950s that general equilibrium theory, and the pro posi-
tion that competition produced efficient results, too k hold thro ugh the works of Arrow 
and Debreu (1 954) , Debreu (1959), and McKenzie (1 98 1), among others. 
A piece of the puzzle was still missing, and tha t was the macroeco nomic analys is 
o f cyclica l unemployment. Thi s was provided by Keynes (1936) in the midst o f the 
Great Depressio n. What Keynes showed and post-Keynesians ha ve further developed 
is that a combina tion of monetary and fi scal policies co uld dampen the severity of 
business cycles. Although the Real Business Cycle model has ra ised quest ions about 
Keynesian theory and even the efficacy of monetary and fi scal po licy, the sta te of the 
debate betwee n New Keynesian versus Real Business Cycle theories leaves po licyma kers 
with far greater countercyclica l tools than were available during the Great D epression 
(Mankiw, 1989; Abel, Bernanke. and C roushore, 20 11 ). 
The current macroeco nomic deba te has both the Keynesians and the Rea l Business 
Cycle theorists agreeing upon one critica l fea tu re o f modern business cycles. namely, 
wage rigidity. That n ominal wages are rigid in the union sector is not surprising. They 
are a key feature of the co llective bargaining agreement. But wages also do not decline 
during recessions in the nonunion sector, a t least since the G reat Depression (Dobrescu , 
2012)l 6 
The finding of wage rigidity during recess ions in the nonunion sector puts to rest 
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co ncern s raised by the old eco nomic grea ts like Malthus and Commons. Even during 
a recession and a period of high unempl oyment market wage rates do no t fall. One 
explanation for this wage rigidity is tha t firms are less risk averse th an workers a nd 
are thu s willing to offer in surance against income instability due to the business cycle. 
The other argument and the one advanced in this chapter (see Section IV) , stresses 
that wage cuttin g is no t done even by nonunion firms because wage reductions in 
the face of declining demand is not a self-enforcing adjustment to declining prod uct 
demand. 
The upshot of thi s brief historical analys is is that. from the perspective of modern 
labor economics, the theory ava ilable to policymakers a t the time of the passage of 
the Wagner Act in 1935 was flawed or no t yet developed. It lacked the microeco nomic 
foundations of labor markets being developed by Hicks and others; it lacked the 
fundamental welfare theorems of general eq uilibrium theory; and it lacked a modern 
business cycle theory . The Act's fear that absent unions there was nothing tha t could 
prevent recurring depressions was out of date by the la te 1930s, and there is nothing in 
modern business cycle theo ry to suggest th a t unions help to prevent recurring business 
cycles .17 
Indeed prevailing economic opinion had already moved away from this position by 
the la te 1940s, when the Taft-Hartley Act was passed, moving labor policy from favoring 
unionizat ion to neu tra lity. 18 Unions might sometimes be part of the problem ra ther tha n 
being part of the so lution. 
Stil l. many labor law scholars ignore the eco nomic effects o f unions eve n though 
the neoclassical model is so widely accepted in other areas of legal scho la rship. What 
accounts for the widespread resistance to this co nclusion in labor m arkets? One answer 
is the hope that a competing theory, the efficiency wage theory, might be used as an 
eco nomic argument fo r favoring unions. 
The heart of the efficiency wage model is the idea that if you pay wo rkers a higher 
wage they wi ll work harder and be more prod uct ive. It is, after a ll, a pla usible o utcome. 
W orkers are no t like a ny other commodi ty beca use they can adjust their behavio r 
to incentives . As a co nsequence, instead of worker productivity expla ining the wage , 
the wage determines worker productivity by providing incentives to wo rk more 
productively. 
C. Efficiency Wage Model 
The efficiency model can be viewed loosely as repealing the harsh predictions of the 
inverse relat ionship between the union wage and union employment. In the labor law 
literat ure, this has always been a favored line of thinking . The origina l example of the 
efTiciency wage model was Henry Ford's decision to pay wages far a bove competiti ve 
levels in order to secure a more re liable and productive labor force. 
The seminal efficiency wage model centers on the idea of a "gift-exchange" (AkerloL 
1984). The gift is a wage above the market-clea ring wage. The basic theo ry is th a t the 
worker unders tands th at she is receiving a gift in the form of a wage a bove the market-
clearing wage . What is often neglected when scholars appl y this model to the uni on secto r 
is the importance of identifying the gift-giver. If the gift is coming from the firm. wo rkers 
reciprocate by becoming more loya l to the firm . putting out more work effo rt a nd thu s 
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beco ming more productive . W orkers who are being treated well by their empl oyer may. 
for exam ple. respond to a busie r than usual schedule by putting o ut m ore effo rt. The 
converse is a lso true: workers who think they are being bad ly trea ted may respond by 
putting fo rward less effort. 
T o see how the theory is likely to operate it is useful to describe the paradigmatic 
example of the efficiency wage: tha t is. Henry Ford 's $5 a day wage . There are va rio us 
stories of the famous episode .19 If one is to take H enry F ord a t his wo rd . which was cited 
in the fam ous case o f Dodge 1'. Ford lv!otor Companv. he indicated: ·"' M y ambiti on ... is 
to employ sti ll more men: to spread the benefits of this industria l system to the greatest 
possib le num ber, to help them b uild up their lives and their homes. T o do this. we are 
putting the greates t sha re of o ur p rofit s back into the business.'" 20 In this story. H enry 
F o rd is just a good , very rich ca pita li st who wa nt s to sha re pa rt of the good fo rtunes of 
the corpo ra tio n with the workers ra ther tha n just with the sha reholders. 
The hi storically more gro unded story is more co mplica ted and less enco ura ging. 
H enry F ord was one of the fir st of the great entrepreneurs o f the industrial age . H e was 
ra pidly expanding the business to meet a burgeo ning dema nd for the low-cost cars he 
was producing. This required a co ncomitant rapid increase in employment. The pro blem 
was tha t , in 1920, he was prima ril y hiring workers o tT the farm who were unaccusto med 
to the discipline and o n-time perfo rm ance of manufacturing jo bs. W orkers were o ften 
not o n time or strayed fr o m the assembl y line . Others just left to go back to the fa rm . 
The $5 a day wage, which was ro ughl y do uble the competiti ve wage a t that time, was a n 
attempt to reduce turnover and make existing workers mo re p roductive . 
The $5 a day wage required no elaborate monit oring. for if the boss did not think 
workers were meeting the standa rd. they co uld be freely fired under the then and now 
existing employment-at-will r ule. In o ther words, the effi ciency wage model requires tha t 
workers increase wo rk effo rt as a respo nse to the higher wage. The efficiency wage is thus 
a n incentive sto ry. Ford paid a higher wage, but the cos t o f th a t higher wage was o ffse t 
by a m ore productive wo rkfo rce . Besides requiring no mo nito ring, F ord co uld se t the 
wage a t wha tever level he tho ught maximized profit s. The goa l o f the $5 wage wa s no t to 
lose m oney: it was to make grea te r p ro fit s. 
H ow does thi s story play out in a unio nized firm'? First. to stay faithful to hi story, I 
note tha t F ord was vehementl y antiunion . The violence tha t erupted when the United 
Aut o W orkers organized the Ford M otor Company is we ll kn own in labor hi story. 
H enry F ord hired a sec urity force that engaged in battles with union organize rs. 
Obvio usly, the creato r in real life o f the efficiency wage concept did no t take kindly to 
having his facilities orga nized. And tha t fac t is import ant. 
The efficiency wage sto ry simpl y does not fit in a unionized company. First , the 
idea tha t wo rkers will wo rk ha rde r beca use the jo b pays be tter than their next bes t 
j ob prospect depends on low-cos t monito ring. The effi ciency wage is itself an implicit 
contrac t: higher wages fo r hi gher effo rt. F or this dea l to wo rk, the company must 
be able to discharge a shirking worker quickly and a t low cos t. The efficiency wage 
pays for it self by encouraging wo rkers, who find the above-ma rket wage sufficiently 
compelling. to work hard to keep the job , whether this means o n-time arriva l, few 
a bsences . and no shirking on the job. Tha t mechanism will be di srupted if the wo rker 
fo und to be shirking can m o unt a nd susta in a cla im o f un fa ir dismissal. From the 
worker 's standpoint , the c la im makes sense: for some wo rkers ca ught shirking. it may 
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have been a one-time lapse or the superviso r may have made a mistake in rendering 
the discharge. The presence of a union wi th a grievance-arbitration process in the col-
lect ive bargaining agreement protects workers from these mistakes : but at the same 
time it force s the employer either to engage in cost ly monitoring or to to lerate a certain 
am ount of ··shirking. " thus reducing the benefits to the employer that are promised by 
the efficiency wage theory. 
Second ... who ge ts credit' ' for the gift'1 In collective bargaining, the gift-giver is the 
union . After a ll. it is the union that fought for the higher wage . The press rings with 
stories in which un ion leaders claim that their gains were ··won'· a t the bargaining table 
and had to be wrung out of the boss. The stories are quite plausible . H owever, for the 
gi ft-exchange versio n of the efficiency wage theory to make economic sense, the gift 
has to be seen to come from the employer, fo r it is the employer's willingness to pay the 
above-market wage that encourages workers to be more loyal and grateful. 
The efficiency story is a live and well , however, in many nonunion sectors of the 
economy. None of the economic models of the efficiency theory sees the efficiency wage 
as the product of collective bargaining where the parties can use their economic weapons 
to achieve the best contract for their side. To genera te greater efficiency to cover the cost 
o f the higher wage. the efficiency wage is calcula ted based on offsetting the higher cost 
with greater effort. It is entirely an incent ive device . Nonunion firms may pay higher 
than market wages, bo th to reduce their turnover and monitoring costs but a lso to avoid 
unionization . 
Elements of the effi ciency wage model can be found in Freeman and Medoff in their 
book What Do Unions Do ? (1984). They argued that higher union wages might encour-
age higher productivity among workers by providing workers with a voice that could 
affect the workplace environment. As a consequence of voice, workers might gain 
improvements in job senio rity and security tha t would encourage wo rkers to pass on 
skil ls to j uni or workers a nd to work more productively in general. Freema n and Medoff 
provided little evidence that unions could raise productivity high eno ugh to offset the 
union wage premium. The only empirical support for the effect was provided by Brown 
and Medoff (1978). Indeed Freeman and Medoff acknowledged that any positi ve effects 
of unions on productivity would probably not be sufficient to undo the detrimental 
effect of the union pay premium. Con sequ ently, they argued that the gains from the 
good face of unions cou ld only be achieved by policy intervention such as amending 
labor law. 
The vast literature on the subject of the efficiency effect s of unions. much of it stimu-
la ted by the Freema n and Medoff book, showed a negative rather than a positive effect 
on productivity (a ltho ugh not statistically significant). This is summarized in Chapter 4 
o f this volume by Hirsch . 
In sum, unions raise pay, and consequently union firms are at a cost disadvantage 
when competing with nonunion firms. There is no d iscernible offset ting increase in 
worker productivit y. The great loss of union employment has been m ore than offset 
by the growth in domes tic nonunion employment. This is not a story about low wages 
in emerging countries. Instead it is about the existence of a sizeable nonuni on sector in 
every American industry that is able to compete success full y with its unio n competitors 
on the basis of lower labor costs. (See Hirsch. Chapte r 4 in this volume.) 
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II . UNDERSTANDING THE INTERNAL LABOR MARKET 
T hus fa r, I have stressed that the external labo r market is genera lly efficient. The external 
labor market is where individual s search for jobs when they either enter the labor force or 
leave their current empl oyment , and where firm s look fo r new empl oyees. It is "external" 
in the sense tha t it is outside of the firm. What makes the external labor m arket com-
petitive is that firm s in numerous different industries are a ll looking for entry workers 
wit h generalized skill sets . A high school graduate could become a semi-skilled worker 
at Caterpillar. or at JP Morgan. or at a small firm. A college graduate could become a 
management trainee a t Genera l Electric or a web designer for a small fi rm . T he workers· 
general skills may be more or less specialized and better suited fo r some industries than 
others; but they are not firm specific. Hence these workers can work in a range of indus-
tries or for any firm within the industry. T he sa me story can be told of the MBA graduate 
who can be hired into management at Caterpilla r or a t JP M organ , or at a sm all firm . 
Once a worker is hired into a firm, she leaves the external labo r ma rket and enters the 
in te rnal labo r ma rket (ILM). T he internal labor market is the relat ionship between the 
firm and its employees . The ILM consists o f a se t o f exp licit or implicit rules governing 
wages, promotion opportunities, grievance procedures and o ther term s a nd conditi ons 
of empl oyment. In la rge firms, the ILM can be highl y forma lized; in small firm s, it may 
ba rely exist. 
A. Basic Principles of Internal Labor Markets 
T he ILM comes in two broad types: unionized and nonun ionized. In the union ILM . the 
rules governing the workplace are largely a ma tter o f express contrac t; they are written in 
the form of a co llective bargaining agreement a nd are enforceable befo re an arbitra to r, 
a co urt or the N LRB. In the nonunion ILM , the agreements are not contractual; tha t is, 
m os t of their terms cannot be enforced by a thi rd-pa rt y arbitra tor or judge. R ather. the 
nonunion ILM rela tionship is generally one o f empl oyment-a t-will , and most of it s terms 
are subj ect to modification a t will. 
Bo th types of ILMs are generally governed by simila r broad principles , whether lega lly 
enforceable or not. Most hiring takes place a t entry-level jobs which connect the ILM 
to the ELM . Based on perfo rmance or j ob tenure, wo rkers can then be promoted int o 
higher level jobs. Earnings typically ri se with job tenure . In a product market decline. 
adju stments are typically made by reducing hours or laying ofT workers rather than by 
reducing wages; a nd resulting la yoffs or discharges generally a re inversely related to 
seniority. The diffe rence between the uni on and nonunion ILM s is that these character-
istics are co ntractually manda tory in the union ILM. whereas they are non-mandato ry. 
frequently foll owed norms in the nonunion ILM . 
What is described here is a somewhat idealized version of an ILM - or perha ps a 
histo rically contingent ILM , such as that which existed at " blue chip '' companies like 
IBM and AT&T un til the 1980s. Many observe rs have described cha nges in the nature 
of ILM s since the 1980s. characterizing them as an eros ion or even an outright collapse 
of the long-term empl oyment rela tionship and mutual expecta ti ons tha t a re central to 
the idea lized ILM (Stone. 2004). But none has convincingly shown that ILM s functi on 
anything like externa l "spot" markets for labo r. So vve will st ick with the idealized IL M 
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for analytic purposes, while recognizing that this overstates the difference o n the ground 
between ILM s and ELMs. 
From a policy perspective there is a huge difference between externa l and internal 
labor m arkets. Whereas ELMs are generally efficient because market forces discipline 
the parties ex ante , there is no reason to assume that internal la bor m a rkets are efficient. 
M ost importantly. whereas workers are mobile in the ELMs. they are less mobile in the 
ILM s, in part because of the firm- specific training they undertake. Consequently, market 
di scipline is muted in ILMs . 
The analysis of ILMs began during the 1950s when Kerr (1954) a nd Dunlop (1958) 
described the institutional realities of internal markets. This pioneering work did not 
attempt to integrate the ILM as an institution into the neoclassical th eory of labor 
markets. But that integration has come about since 1970 as the efficiency aspects o f the 
ILM were developed by Doeringer and Piore (1971); Williamso n, Wachter and Harris 
(1975); Okun ( 198 1); and Freeman and Medon~ (1984). The ILM is thu s no newcomer 
to neoclassical labor economics. It has been an integral part of labor economics for over 
30 yea rs. 
B. Relationship between Internal and External Labor Markets 
An important feature for both the union and the nonunion ILM is the manner in which 
they co nnect with the ELM . A s noted , the ELM is differentiated in worker skill s largely 
by the amount of education workers have received , and workers are hired into the ILM 
at entry-level jobs. This is true for all levels of education, though the ports of entry differ. 
Upon hiring. workers receive job-specific or firm-specific training, which enables them to 
m ove up the promotion ladder. Employees tend to receive higher wages based on senior-
ity and the amount of specific training they have undertaken . Hourly pay tends to tluctu-
a te little over the business cycle . Instead, the stage of the business cycle is manifested in 
hours worked. 
Whereas the market discipline of the ELM controls entry wages for entry-level jobs, 
it has only indirect control over the great variety ofjobs filled by internal promotions in 
the ILM s. O ver the innumerable job titles that exist in the United States economy, very 
few are determined solely by the ELM . Yet the ELM does discipline all the ILM jobs 
beca use employees always have the right to quit and are likely to do so ifj o b opportuni-
ties are more favorable at other firms. As expected, job turnover is higher for workers 
with little job tenure since starting over with a new employer typically means starting at 
that firm 's entry-level position and entry pay; that usually represents a significant loss for 
m ore senior workers. Since young entry-level workers are mobile, they are likely to earn 
a marke t-based wage , while the older, less mobile workers are vulnerable because market 
discipline imposes little direct constraint on the employer. 
Nevertheless, the external market s matter a great deal in controlling the pay and 
working conditions in internal labor markets. Few workers need to be mobile. A s is true 
in economics generally, it is the worker on the margin of stay versus quit who wields 
intluence. The worker on the margin will have the best information o n alternative job 
opportunities and is likely to share it with o ther workers. The employer who se ILM is 
inconsistent with the relevant ELMs, in terms of wages , benefit s a nd o ther terms and 
conditio ns of empl oyment, will not be able to hire a nd retain a qualified wo rkforce . 
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With the exception of wages, benefit s, and other terms of conditi ons of empl oyment 
employers retain discretio n over other matte rs whet her the firm is unionized o r not. 
Employers retain broad d iscretion , for example, to choose the firm' s technology and 
to co nstruct job descriptions in accordance wit h that techn ology. Virtua lly all product 
market decisions are decided unilatera lly by the employer. Relations with the firm's 
other stakeholders are also typica lly de termined by the employer witho ut any input from 
employees. 
C. Four Central Economic Factors that Affect the ILM 
The ILM has four foundat io nal factors that d istinguish it from ELMs and that create 
potential inefficiencies: fi rm-specific training, ri sk avers ion. asymmetric info rmat io n and 
transaction cos ts.-' 1 
1. Firm-specific training 
Firm-specific training is the core rationale for lo ng-term attachments and thus for the 
ILMs (Wachter a nd Wright, 1990). Without firm- speci fic training. there would be no 
advantage to the firm in retaining a current employee as compared to hiring a new 
employee each day. Firm-specific training makes workers more valuable to their current 
employer than to other employers. The resu lt is a wedge or surplus between their value 
to their current employer versus their value in the ELM. When this surplu s is shared 
between the firm and the empl oyee, the firm has a n incentive to retain workers with 
jo b-specific training a nd workers have a simila r ince ntive to stay with the employer. 
The surplus from firm-specific training is a lso perhaps the mos t important single factor 
enabling firms to pay efficiency wages or wages above competitive levels. 
The problem is that, while the employer and employee a re disciplined initially by the 
usual ELM forces, firm -specific investments in tra ining create a lock-in beca use the 
inves tments are sunk and have no value o ut side of the match. T his creates a b ila teral 
monopoly bargaining situa tio n and the prospect of inefficient rent- seeking as each party 
attempts to take more of the surplus than migh t ha ve been agreed to. This lock -in is a 
clear break with competi tive markets tha t require that wo rkers be mobile. The ILM can 
thus be efficient, where the surplu s is made as large as possible by cooperative behavior, 
or it ca n be reduced o r eliminated by adve rsa ria l behavior. Altho ugh the parties have 
an incentive to maximize the size of the surplu s, there is no market mecha nism that 
guara ntees this behavior. Consequen tly. the ILM is vulnera ble to market fa ilures. 
Ironically, for th ose who identify the C hicago School with the ass umption of perfectly 
competiti ve markets, the lock-in problem created by ILM s was originally identified by 
some of the greats of the C hicago School; namely, Becker (1964 ), Mincer ( 1962) and Oi 
(1 962), among others. 
The nature of the market fa ilure is easi ly described. If the par ties cou ld tru st each o ther 
and prevent rent-seeking, each wo uld have an incentive to make the op tima l level of 
in vestment in the relationship . H owever. each party has an incentive to act opportunisti-
cally once the tra ining is completed . The incenti ve to act opportunistically is great if the 
costs of the investment a re not shared. Suppose. for example, tha t the employer co uld 
ge t the employees to bear a ll the training costs . Once trained , the employees wo uld be in 
a vulnerable posi tion. The employer could attempt to divert a lmos t the en tire surplu s to 
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itself by threatening to fire the workers unless they accepted a minimal return. Pushed 
against the wall, the employees would have little choice but to remain with the employer 
and take any wage above the market wage paid in the ELM. H ence, the employer has 
a potential gain from acting opportunistically. Similarly, if the employer paid the entire 
training costs vvith the expectation of getting all of the resulting surplus , the employees, 
once trained, could threaten to quit unless the employer agreed to give up its ret urn on 
the joint inves tment. Pushed against the same wa ll , the employer wo uld be willing to take 
a very low return on its inves tment if the workers agreed to stay. because it could not 
secure equally productive employees on the external market. 
In the face of the ri sk that opportunistic behavior might undo the mutual gains from 
inves tment in firm-specific training, the parties can develop self-en fo rcing norms that 
prevent opportunistic rent-seeking. 22 The key characteristic of the self-enfo rcing norm or 
contract was described by Becker (1964). Becker ' s solutio n was for the empl oyer and the 
employee to share in the costs of the inves tment. In a simple model with one empl oyer 
and one employee , the cost sha ring would create an incentive-compatible contract where 
the incentive for opportunistic behavior might be elimina ted. Cost-sharing ta kes the 
form of a '' training wage" that is lower than what the employee could earn in an ELM 
without job-specific training, but higher than the employee's current productivity which 
is very low as he first acquires specific tra ining. With the current costs shared , the payo ff 
for bo th parties wo uld come after the tra ining is complete. In this case, the employer 
would have no incentive to fire the worker and the worker would have no incentive to 
quit because each would only receive a ret urn on their investment if the relatio nship were 
maintained . 
Unfortunately, a threat of employer opportunism rema ins even if the job inves tment 
costs are sha red. Assume there are a number of employees. If the workers are not orga-
nized and cannot act in concert , the employer could pick o ff one vulnerable employee at 
a time, and threaten to fire the employee absent a wage reductio n. For each indi vidual 
worker, the threat to fire that worker is real because the employer might secure its 
expected return o n the joint inves tment from the continued employment of the o ther 
workers. Each worker could be put individually in that position , and would bo th stay 
on the job and accept a lower wage, as long as the empl oyer allows the worker to receive 
some benefit fr om the investment. That is, workers are better otT by no t quitting as long 
as they are paid any premium. however small, over the wage available in the ELM. 
Since each worker believes tha t the others will be offered the same ba rgain, each worker 
knows that quitting is suboptimal. Hence, the employer can successfully act opportunis-
ticall y by getting the employees to accept a lower, tho ugh st ill positive, return on their 
inves tment. 
This inequality in bargaining power is reduced if the workers can act in concert by 
becoming unionized. F orced to deal with the workers as a single unit , the employer's 
threat to fire the workers does not ring true because the threa t would also cause the 
employer to lo se whatever it invested in the relationship . One of the impo rtant ratio-
nales for labor unions is that they can protect workers from opportunistic behavior by 
employers who might otherwise seek to divert the portion of the surplus that belongs to 
wo rkers. 
Ca n the same res ults be achieved without a unio n? Arguably they can. Where the 
empl oyment rela tionship is ongo ing or where the employer mu st regul a rly hire wo rkers 
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in the ELM , th e sharing of costs can be a self-enforcing norm . If the employer and its 
employees need to make ongoing inves tment s in their relationship, employer opportun-
ism in the initia l peri od will discourage the employees fr om agreeing to the second set 
of investment s. Hence, repea t play red uces the potential for opportunism. Similarly. 
if the employer must return to the ELM to hire additional workers, the employer's 
concern for its reputation will deter it from behaving opportunistica lly: otherwise it will 
be difficult to hire new employees or to get these employees to invest in their relation-
ship. Consequently, the importance to the employer of reta ining a reputation for fa ir 
play, both externally and within an ongoing relationship. can make the arrangement 
se lf-enforcing. The self-enforc ing feature of the arra ngement will be greatest, obviously, 
where both are present - the employer needs to return regularly to the ELM and the 
re la tionship with each empl oyee is ongo ing (or repeat-play). 
The option to unionize provides addi tional protection against opportunism by a non-
union employer. As noted above, the evidence is over whelming that controlling for skilL 
job tenure, educa tion, demographics, and location, unionized workers are paid more 
than comparable nonunion wo rkers. This suggests that, in the unionized wo rkplace , a 
large share of the investment in firm- specific training is paid for by the employer in the 
form of above-market wages. G iven the higher labor cos ts associa ted with a unionized 
labor force, it may not be necessary for the nonunion workers to ac tually form a union, 
for the eve r-present threat of unioniza tion can be particularly effective in di scouraging 
employer opportunism. 
Ironicall y, although the union sec tor is struggling due to nonunion competition, the 
nonunion sector has benefitted from the ex istence of the union sector because of a deter-
rent effect on nonunion employers who might otherwise act opportunistically if not for 
the fear of being unionized . 
2. Risk aversion 
If the parties to the employment relationship were ri sk neutraL the great bulk of pay 
as well as promoti ons would be strictly performance based. That is because pay-for-
performance creates the grea test incentives for employees to work a t their highest level 
of perfo rmance, and is therefore wealth maximizing. The evidence, however, is that 
wo rkers are more risk ave rse than are employers. That is, employees prefer to receive a 
stable income, rather than an amount tha t va ries with the fortunes of the firm , even if the 
varia ble pay has a higher expected value than the steady stream . This risk aversion may 
be a function of employers· better access to fin ancial markets to smooth out the conse-
quence of revenue lluctuations: but it simply may be due to the fact that workers don' t 
like fluctu ations in their income. Stable does not mean constant; in fact, workers tend to 
prefer a steadily ri sing wage profil e. That is, wo rkers make more inves tment s in the form 
of reduced income when they are yo unger, and rece ive the returns on those inves tments 
when they are older. The va lue of firm- specific inves tments thus only partly explains the 
widely observed fact that workers· income tends to be higher as they ge t older. 
If employees were not risk ave rse, the grea t bulk of pay wo uld be performance based. 
Wage increases, bonuses, etc. would all be based on performance. Pro motions too would 
be based on performance. The preference fo r pay-fo r-perfo rmance is that it is wealth 
maximizing. It creates the grea test incentives fo r employees to work at their highest 
susta inable level of perfo rm ance. 
36 Research handbook: economics of labor !em· 
Almost all businesses work to find the best tradeoff in their compensation arrange-
ments between stable wages and the high -powered incentives provided by pay-for-per-
fo rmance. This is the same problem that the firm solves to determine the best efficiency 
wage level. Pay-for-performance may take the form of stock optio ns or bonuses, or it 
may take the form of annual sala ry increases or prom otions based o n performance . In 
thi s regard. unionized firms tend to have the least amount of pay-for-performance. This 
migh t be due to a greater distrust of employers, higher-than-no rmal risk aversion, or a 
preference for minimizing pay disparities ac ross workers. 
3. Asymmetric information 
Ano ther important feature of ILM s is the presence of informatio n asymmetries . 
Asymmetric information exis ts in the ILM when it is rela tively mo re costly for one o f 
the parties to observe or monitor the quantity and quality of worker input s. Although 
the employee is in volved in an ongoing re la tionship with the employer , the firm has 
information advantages over employees. In particula r , the empl oyer has superior info r-
matio n abo ut the productivity of its workers . Remember that the labor demand curve 
depends on the marginal productivity o f the worker. Except in the unu sual case where 
the worker produces a good or service fr om scratch and se ll s it herse lf to the customer, 
the wo rker 's marginal prod uctivity wi ll be unobservable to the worker. The worker, 
however, has a n informatio n ad vantage over another key item: namely, the wo rker's 
effo rt . Because monitoring is cos tly. employe rs can only es timate their employees' work 
effort. 
One answer to the problem of asymmetry of inform ati on has been provided by gov-
ern ment regula tion of the ILM in cases where employers ha ve a significant info rmation 
adva ntage a nd the stakes fo r employees are large. Tha t i'S the case for bo th workplace 
safety and deferred compensation in the fo rm of re tirement pay. Moreover, empl oyer 
reputa tion may no t be a sensi tive co ntrol in such cases because of the difficulty and 
complexity in observing existing safety conditions and deferred compensat ion, and in 
separating out the role of empl oyer oppo rtunism fro m changes in technology or the 
product market. The problem of asymmetric informa tio n is resolved here by government 
regula tio n in the form of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) a nd 
the Occupational Safety and Health Act (0SHA). 23 
Outside o f these areas where government informat ion fill s a n existing gap , what 
expla ins the lack o f complex contracting to control o ther informatio n asymmetries mo re 
genera lly? The sa me question can be asked about job-specific tra ining, which might a lso 
benefi t from con tracts that protect each party's vulnerable investme nts. The union con-
trac t a lthough lengthy, ha rdly covers a ll possible contingencies. In the nonunion sector, 
there is no co ntrac ting at all. The answer to the existence of limited contracting rather 
than co mplex contingent claims contract to dea l with every contingency has to be the 
tra nsaction cos ts inherent in contracting in the ILM . 
4. Transaction costs 
Transaction costs involve the costs associated with writing and en forcing agreements 
tha t govern the rela tionship between empl oyers and employees. As noted in the sectio n 
above. the presence of asymmetric information leads one to expect complex con tin gent-
sta te contracts. As described by Wachter and Wright (1990). 
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[s]uch contracts would specify what happens in the face of po tent ia l exogenous changes in tech-
nol ogy or in the demand for the fim1 's o utput , and hence inputs. Combined with risk aversion 
and match-specitic inves tments, such contracts would a lso describe the parties' agreed-upon 
tradeoffs between income smoothing and the provision o f appropriate incen ti ves fo r correct 
reporting of asymmetric in fo i·mati on. 
This is no simple task; it would challenge even the best drafter of contracts. The term 
"bounded ratio nality" can be used to describe the inability of contract drafters to antici-
pate all the potential states of the world that might emerge. and how the parties should 
respond to each particular sta te of the world . 
Several factors make contracting in the ILM pa rticularly costly. First , many jobs are 
idiosyncratic to the ILM . Besides the large number of different jobs, workers within 
the same job wi ll differ in their amount of firm-specific training. Second, the number of 
interactions is large. ILM contracts are not for a single delivery of a product o n a date 
an d time to be cont racted for. The employee's performance is continuous over the work 
time and over the days o f employment. There is not one deliverable: there are many. 
Third , jobs are also interco nnected . One worker's performa nce affects the potential per-
formance of workers who a re in the same team, the same office, the same assembly line, 
etc. Finally , jobs evolve over time, fundamentally with changes in technology. or in more 
minor but continuo us ways with changes in product demand.24 
The importance of transaction costs makes labor and employment law central to 
the modern theory of the firm. which begins with Coase (1937) and is elaborated by 
Williamso n (1985) . Hart (1989) , a nd other scholars. In the theory of the firm, simply 
stated, the firm faces " make or buy" deci sions at every turn. Take the firm that makes 
computers. It must decide as to each part , fo r example. the microprocessor , the operating 
system, and the keyboard. whether to make it interna ll y or purchase it through suppliers. 
Much of that make-o r-buy decision is based o n techn o logy, patents, and simi lar factors. 
For example. the firm will normally produce for itse lf computer parts over which the 
firm has patent pro tection and ha s developed the technology. 
In this decisio n-making process, a single question reappears: how easy is it to contrac t 
for any individua l part or input? The prevailing view is that ho lding other factors con-
stant a firm is likely to buy in the market when the input being purchased is standard 
rather than idiosyncratic. It is likely to make rather than to buy when the input is more 
specialized or idiosyncratic. Also, the firm is more likely to make rather than buy when 
information asym metries are important. Info rmat ion a symmetries make third-party 
enforcement of a contract difficult and error-prone beca use key fact s are not o bservable 
or verifiable by an arbitrator or judge. Finally, the higher the cost of specifying terms 
in advance - as in the case of repeated interactions, interco nnected tasks, and evolving 
tasks a nd technology - the more likely the firm is to make rather than to buy. 
All of these make/buy decisions turn on the amount of transaction costs, which is why 
transaction costs are central to the boundaries of the firm. What result s is the following 
conclusion: buy when the transaction costs of contracting are low. When transaction 
costs are low, the parties can wTite a contract that is likely to be largely complete. Holes 
in the contract will still occur when an unexpected event h appens over which the parties 
have not contracted. But, given sufficient existing contractual completeness. the court 
can usually fill the hole by inferring a contract term based on what the parties themselves 
wo uld have done if they had anticipated the event. On the other hand . if an event occurs 
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for which there are no relevant contract terms. the court will assume tha t the event is 
outside of the four co rners of the contract and is therefore no t covered by the contract. 
H ence. the theory of the firm reso lves a paradox that is created by the four factors 
discussed above. Specifically, the economic theory sugges ts that, with idiosyncratic 
prod ucts (or , in labor market term s, wo rkers with different amounts of job-specific 
tra ining on tasks that may be unique to the firm) and high informa tion asymmetr ies , 
the part ies have an incentive to write complex state-contingent contracts. Yet these very 
sa me factors that contribute to high transaction costs make the contract more costly to 
vvrite . more incomplete than complete. and hence more like ly to be subject to judicial 
error. Consequently. the theory of the firm provides a different answe r: instead of using 
complex state-contingent contracts , use no contract at all. Ins tead. " make"' rather than 
'" buy"" by bringing tha t act ivity inside the firm a nd use the firm 's hierarchy to control that 
input (Coase, 1937; Williamson, Wachter, and Harris, 1975). 
A transaction cos t theory of the firm and the make/buy distincti on is genera lly success-
ful. One almost never observes complex contrac ting inside the firm, whether in the ILM 
or elsewhere. The firm might write simple employment contracts for some executive offi-
cers or specia lized employees; but these contracts are usua ll y short and stra ightforward , 
and mostly deal with the possibility of termination. 
The collective bargaining contract is the one grea t except ion to the non-contractual 
na ture of the firm . It is the only detailed enfo rceable co ntract that the firm writes to deal 
with act ivities and with actors that are who lly inside the firm. Its policy implica tions, 
discussed in the next section, are extremely important. 
III . CONTRACTING IN THE UNION ILM 
As no ted above, one way to deal with the complexity of the ILM and the potential 
for opportunism is to meet it head on; that is, to write o r a t leas t attempt to write the 
complex state-co ntingent contrac t that describes each potential state o f the world that 
might occur and , fo r each possible sta te of the world, what the parties wish to happen. 
Bo unded rationality and the many contingencies that the parties to an employment 
re lationship face ma ke that task impossible. But that is what union contrac ts attempt to 
do. And that is why those contracts often run to hundreds of pages . Even so, they are 
no toriously incomplete . The proof of the degree of co ntrac tual incompleteness in union 
contracts is the number of grievances that o ften occ ur and the costs of resolving them. 
These costs can include the fees of outside arbitrators, the time of lawyers (or manag-
ers and stewards) representing the parties, the work-time loss. and the ill-will that o ften 
co ntinues beyond the conflict 's reso lution. 
Beyo nd dispute resolution costs, however. a frequently cited cos t of union contracting 
is the rigidity imposed by the collective bargaining agreement. All of the fact ors cited 
above make rigid contract terms expensive, especially in a world where there are constan t 
changes in techn ology, competitive press ures on the firm , a nd the state of the economy. 
Fixed contrac t terms canno t be the low-cost answer to these conditions. 
Take th e seemin gly m ost easi ly resolved type of dispute: was the employee's perfo r-
mance or behavior acceptable or sufficiently below contract levels as to merit the employ-
ee's dismi ssa!'l Each of the element s that make contract writing difficult co mes into play . 
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First. wha t level of pe rfo rmance is to be expected? Jobs a re idiosy ncra tic as is the am o unt 
of specific training underta ken by the employee. In the extreme, standards may have to 
be set on an employee-to-employee basis. Seco nd , the employee's performance m ay be 
accepta ble, even consummate some of the time. while ot her times performance is below 
tha t contemplated by the co ntract. It is no easy task to wr ite a contract tha t defines what 
pe rcentage of below-par perfo rmances merits discharge . The third factor, jo b intercon-
nec tedness, makes the task tha t much more difficul t. Was unsa ti sfacto ry performa nce 
truly the fau lt of the empl oyee or did a nother empl oyee's behavior, or even the supervi-
so r' s behavior, lead to the unsatis factory performance') Finally, how is the question of 
discharge to be resolved if the technology has changed to make the job more di ffic ult , or 
if the prod uct market has declined to make the empl oyee's perfo rmance less producti ve 
even fo r the same level of work effo rt? 
All of these factors contribute to making d isp ute reso lution d ifficult even fo r the core 
quest ion of worker perfo rma nce. The employee may cla im that her wo rk effort was high . 
The employer may co mplain that the empl oyee's prod uctivity was low. Bo th may be 
true in the complex ILM , where work effort and prod uctivity a re no t one and the same. 
Even apart from the difficulty of specifying the weight tha t each sho uld have in judging 
performance, a pro blem is tha t the em ployer cannot eas ily determine the wo rker's effo rt 
a nd the worker ca nno t easily determine her prod uctivi ty. 
If this were not complex enough , add ye t a not her fac tor. Since effo rt and prod uctivity 
a re not eas ily o bservable and verifiable, they a re subj ec t to the parties' manipula ti on . 
A t the m oment of di spute resolutio n. the neutra l a rbitra to r or judge must rely on the 
pa rt ies' representa tio ns abo ut the fac ts. Even if the pa rties were ac ting in good faith , the 
disp ute would be d ifficult to judge reliably. If the parties can manipulate the data to their 
own adva ntage with little risk o f detec tion, the task of reaching the correct judgment is 
ve ry d ifficult indeed . 
Ano ther interesting fea ture o f the union ILM. to which I have a lread y a lluded , is that 
it handles the tradeo ff between incentives and risk aversion with a nea r pola r so lution . 
Maximizing the value o f the co rpora tion and making workers as productive as possible 
is bes t accomplished by making pay dependent o n perfo rmance. But in union ILMs, pay 
fo r perfo rmance is a lmost entirely a bsent. Pay increases a re based almost entirely o n jo b 
tenure a nd no t on perfo rmance; even pro mo tions may be based la rgely o n seni ority . In 
add ition. the unio n "just ca use'' prov ision and grieva nce procedures make it ve ry cos tly 
fo r the em ployer to penalize workers who a re underperfo rming. These two factors a lone 
- no extra pay for good perfo rmance and little pena lty for poo r perfo rma nce- su gges t a 
very nega tive effect of unio ns on firm productivit y. 
Unio n prefe rence again st pay-for-performance is part ly ideo logica l a nd part ly based 
on distrust fed by asymmetric info rmation. U nions typica ll y favo r na rrow wage d iffe r-
entia ls o n ideo logical grounds . Indeed a genera l findin g in the union premium lite ra ture 
is tha t the mos t skilled wo rkers ge t the smalles t unio n wage premium, while the least 
skilled receive the highest premium . Distru st a lso pl ays a key ro le. D ata on p roduct ivit y 
a re availa ble to the company, but not the uni o n. Even if the co m pany makes informa tion 
available to the uni on , it cann ot be verified. If the pa rt ies are not in a rela ti onship of trust 
and confidence, it is unlikely tha t they will agree to base pay on info rma tion tha t ca nn ot 
be verified by both pa rties. 
Ano th er factor making the uni on ILM atypical in the co ntract world is tha t the 
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relat ionship is no t a voluntary one as far as the employer is concerned. Genera lly, con-
tracts are entered into voluntarily by the parties. Contract law serves as " the handmaiden 
of the parties" and supplies a set of default terms, most of which the part ies can change 
volun tarily. Parties can res trict or expand the scope of the contract to fit their needs. 
There are few mandato ry terms, with the exception of an implied obligat ion of "good 
faith and fair dealing .. , Commercial contracts typically run for a limited term so that. if 
the parties do have a falling out, the contract can be terminated. 
The co llective bargaining contract is also unlike any other commercia l co ntract. F irst 
o f all. once a union is selected by a maj ority of bargaining unit members, the company is 
required by law to bargain with the union even if it prefers to bargain with another union 
or with n o union at a ll. The employer must bargain in good fa ith over a set of manda-
tory topics , including wages, hours, and o ther terms and conditions of employment. 
The parties can a lso deploy "economic weapons" - the union can strike o r the employer 
can lock out the workers - to press ure the other party should they reach an impasse in 
their bargaining. Although the law's goal may be peaceful labor relations, that peace is 
achieved and punctuated by the use of these " weapons." 
No ne of this is meant as criticism of the NLRA in terms of its overa ll effec t on the 
economy. In another chapter in this volume I argue that the NLRA was justified. and 
has in fact been extraordinarily successful. The argument brings in issues of political 
economy that are beyond the scope of this chapter , but its main point is worth noting 
here. Before the passage of the NLRA, labor history in the United Sta tes. as elsewhere, 
was filled with stories of violent strikes. At times revolution was in the air. Only the 
NLRA, and its nationwide legitimizatio n of unions, collective ba rgaining, and peaceful 
st rikes, was able to bring a close to that violent chapter of history. 
Putting as ide the social value of labor law, however, the union ILM has elements 
that are clearly costly to employers. Apart from raising wages a nd benefit s above com-
petitive levels, un ions also bring about a degree of forma liza tion in contract writing a nd 
enfo rcement tha t is inherently costly . 
IV. ILM CONTRACTING IN THE NONUNION FIRM 
Whereas the union sector takes on the complexities of the ILM by writing explicit co n-
tracts, the non uni on sector does no t. This lack of contracting raises two questions. First , 
why does the nonunion ILM do virtually no contracting at a ll , versus, for example, 
so me contracting but less than the union sector? Second, how can the nonunion ILM be 
successful in mitigating or eliminating the po tential for employer opportunism ') 
Before answering these questions it is important to explain how I am using the word 
"contract. " Economists use the term contrac t to mean an agreement by the parties, 
which can be implicit o r explicit a nd is not necessarily enforceable. Indeed the question 
of enforceability is not raised, nor is it of particu lar interest to economists. pa rticula rly 
since the contracts are often constructed to be self-enforcing. In thi s chap ter, the differ-
ence between judicia l enforceabili ty and unenforceability is an importan t di stinction. I 
will use the term "contract ," whether explicit or implicit, to mean a judicially enforce-
able agreement. and I wi ll use the term '·norm" to mean a mutual expectation that is not 
intended to be judicially enforceable.:5 
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Wha t then explains the difference between the use of enfo rceable contracts in the un ion 
ILM a nd the almost exclusive use o f non-enforceable norms in the nonunion ILM'? A t 
a theoretical leveL the answer is given by the theory of the firm discussed above . R eca ll 
tha t the boundaries of the firm are drawn specifically so tha t the ac tivities brought inside 
the firm are th ose where fo rmal contracting is too difficult or costly, a nd where decision 
making can more efficiently be do ne unila tera lly thro ugh the firm 's hierarchical struc-
ture. The union ILM is the grea t exceptio n, in tha t the act ivity is carried out inside the 
fi rm and the employees bargain co llec tively with the employe r a nd reach an enfo rcea ble 
agreement governing the employmen t re lationship (Dau-Schmidt 1992). 
The implicat io n of this d ivide is enormo usly important. If the transactio n cos t-based 
theory o f the firm is correct, the un ionized firm has a la rge com petitive disad vant age . Bu t 
there is a big " if' ' attached to tha t proposition. In the la te 1800s, employees who were 
d issa tisfied with their terms a nd cond itions of employment wo uld, from time to time. 
a ttempt to organize a uni on and engage in co ncerted activities. Some of those activities 
were illega l under state law, and the police or National G ua rd , or even the regula r a rmy, 
was bro ught in to subdue or cru sh them (W achter , C hapter 15 in this volume ). Indeed , 
the most compelling ratio nale fo r the passage of the N L RA was to end this industrial 
strife, which was harmful to the na tion's econom y. 
T he po int tha t can be drawn from the histo ry is that , prior to the NLRA, the nonu nion 
secto r was a frequently dysfun ctio nal o rganizational type. For the affected employer, the 
cos ts of strikes were just the tip of the iceberg. Disgrun tled employees had many ways 
to pena lize a firm if they chose to do so . Since monito ring is not a nd cannot be co ntinu-
o us, empl oyees in manufacturing or co nstruc tio n, for example, co uld harm the fi rm by 
sabo taging equipment or simply ignoring the need for repairs. Although documenting 
such ac tivity is impossible. it is likely tha t even prio r to an outbreak o f overt co ncerted 
activity, disgruntled empl oyees had many ways to hit back a t an employer who was 
acting unfa irly or o pportunistically. This point was emphas ized by institutionalists such 
as Dunlop (1958) and K err (1954) and theorists like Becker (1 964) . 
The militancy of workers in the earl y o rganizing drives of the 1930s and befo re appea rs 
to retlect intense wo rker unhapp iness with the existing nonun ion I LMs of the time. It is 
no surpri se that worker unres t esca la ted in the Depression, given that employers have 
grea ter po tential to act opportunist ica lly during economic depress ions. thus provo kin g 
increased industria l strife. 
Co nditions seem to be very diffe rent today. At leas t the extremely low levels of strike 
activity wo uld seem to sugges t tha t the nonunion ILM o perates with less oppo rtunism 
tha n in the pas t. 26 H ow does the nonunio n ILM now operate so as to defu se industri a l 
unres t? At this poin t, we return to the theo ry of the firm a nd the core co ncept tha t ac tivi-
ties brought inside the firm are bo th su sceptible to norm-based governance a nd invo lve 
ac tivities too costl y for effec tive co ntract enforcement. 
The no rm-ba sed governance of the nonunion ILM is integra lly tied to the jud i-
cia l doctrine of empl oyment-at -will (Rock and Wachter. 1996). According to the 
employment-a t-will doctrine. "an employer can fire an employee for good reason, bad 
reaso n, or no reason at a ll. " Thi s doctrine can be criticized for appearing to co nd one 
empl oye r opportunism; but thi s criticism entirely mi sses the point. T he p oint o f the 
phraseo logy is to signa l a ju risdicti ona l boundary ra ther than a legal rule that is applied 
in its litera l meaning (R ock a nd Wachter. 1996). By stat in g the employer's p rerogat ives 
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as broadly as possible, the employee who believes herself to be wrongfull y discharged 
cannot sustain a claim . The only exception is a worker who fall s into a policy exception 
such as race or gender discrimination, or illegal re talia tion. 
H ow can a legal regime that allows workers to be discharged for "'no reason at a ll " be 
either fair or efficient? The answer lies in the reason behind the stark and unforgiving 
language. 
To understand that reason, compare thi s actual standard with a counterfactual one 
where the firm states that "it can lower wages for a good rea son, a bad reason, or no 
reason at all. " The wage reduction rule is not se lf-enforcing, and any firm adopting it 
would soon find it impossible to hire wo rkers and difficult to retain them. This rule 
wo uld be entirely self-serving and not joint profit maximizing . The reason is that a firm 
can quickly raise its profits by reducing wages; but the increase in profits comes entirely 
from the lower wages. Workers would obviously respond negatively to such clearly 
opportunistic behavior. Indeed, much of the industrial strife in nonunion firms of the 
1930s arose when companies adopted just this kind of policy. Even though such poli-
cies were primarily adopted during severe downturns in the economy, firms could not 
convince workers of the need to accept the reduction s. 
The underl ying reason for the workers ' distrust of a norm that a llows firms to lower 
wages, even during a recession, goes back to information asymmetries: the firm's eco-
nomic condition is known to the firm. but not to the workforce. Even if the workers 
know that there is a recession and th at production has fallen, they do not know how 
much of a wage reduction is merited. If the firm says that a 10 percent red uction is 
needed, the workers have every reason to distrust that assertion; maybe a 5 percent 
reduction would be sufficient to save the plant and the jobs at the plant. The firm has 
every incentive to overstate its problem to improve profits, while the workers have every 
reason to distrust the firm. This is precisely why a norm of ' 'reducing wages to deal with a 
recess ion" is not an efficient, joint profit-maximizing norm. And, indeed, such a policy is 
rarely used .27 Instead. the almost universal response to a reduction in product demand is 
to reduce hours of work. This is an efficient and self-po licing norm because the firm does 
not have a reason to oversta te its case or overshoot the mark. If the firm reduces hours 
more than is merited by the reduction in demand, output will fall and profits will suffer 
more than they would with a smaller reduction. 
Employment-at-will is more like the self-policing norm of "reducing ho urs in response 
to a recession., than it is like the inefficient norm of " red ucing wages." Discharging a 
productive worker for no reason is counterproductive for the firm . It may lower the wage 
bill , but the firm will lose the effo rts of the worker (who is presumably more productive 
than the next new hire). The rational firm will not discharge a worker for no reason at 
all because it will suffer in the product market. Hence , a norm of employment-at-will is 
altogether different from a norm of lowering wages in response to a recession. 
To many readers, the idea that product market pressures ensure that the rational firm 
wo uld not discharge a worker for no reason might not be reassuring eno ugh . However, 
there are other dynamics endemic to the nature of the ILM it self that tend to ensure 
th a t norms work well. There is now an established literature describing the co nditions 
in which non-legally enforceable norms are a better choice for the parties than legally 
enforceable contracts (Ellickso n, 1991 ). Those conditions, as discussed below, are those 
ofthe ILM. 
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A puzzle remains: if no rational firm would actually fire a worker "for a bad reason or 
no reason, " what is the purpose of the language stating that they can do so'? The answer 
is that the language is intended to be a signal to the courts: namely, it is intended to draw 
a jurisdictional boundary that leaves a firm 's internal business judgments beyond the 
scope ofjudicial review (Rock and Wachter, 1996). From a firm 's vantage point such a 
jurisdictional boundary promotes efficiency by leaving internal employment decisions 
to the discretion of the firm . From a social welfare perspective the jurisdictional bound-
ary is also efficient (putting aside the regulatory protections offered to certain groups 
and activities) because of the high costs and risk of error associated with adjudicating 
discharge decisions . 
Suppose that the employer needed to prove ""just cause. " Monitoring is costly, but it 
would be necessary if the decision were subject to judicial review. As noted above. it is 
always more difficult to prove a point to a court than to learn the facts. Even flagrant 
bad play such as theft may be hard to prove, but what about the more prevalent cases 
where the employee does not perform well enough'' How many examples of poor per-
formance would be sufficient'? How harmful does each incident have to be to be worthy 
of discharge for cause? The correct decision would require the judge to learn the norms 
of the workplace and to sort through facts that are proffered by the firm , and that are 
often not verifiable by the court. Job specificity makes these decisions even more dif-
ficult . In contract disputes. the value of the actual performance is measured against the 
value paid. Idiosyncratic valuations make this task difficult, but this is exactly the same 
problem raised in the ILM where workers have firm- specific training. Market values of 
the appropriate wage rate and productivity are not available. 
If judicial review is contemplated. the parties in the ILM would have to write contin-
gent claims contracts to cover the many different states of the world that could result. 
The contract , no matter how complete, would necessa rily be highly incomplete, particu-
larly as more time elapsed. Courts deal \vith incomplete contracts in two different ways. 
When the contract is largely complete. the court may plug the gap with a term that the 
court believes the parties would have adopted had they known of this exact contingency. 
The more complete the contract, the better the court knows how a gap would be filled. 
However, if the contract is highly incomplete, the court takes a passive stance, and will 
typically rule that there is no contract for that eve nt (Schwartz, 1992). 
The labor contract involving the ILM . no matter how great the ambitions of the 
parties. is likely to be highly incomplete. A court faced with this type of incompleteness 
is thus likely to say that there is no contract for that event. And that would be the right 
response. By stating the employment-at-will doctrine in a form that amounts to saying 
that the employer can do whatever it wants , the firm is simply seeking a judicial finding 
that there is no contract. This jurisdictional boundary ensures that the courts will stay 
out of di sputes in internal labor markets and leave the resolution to the norms of the 
workplace. 
Clearly there is still potential for opportunism in an employment-at-will world where 
judicial enforcement is not available to employees . Recall that job-specific training 
leaves both parties potentially exposed because of their investments in the match. I have 
already discussed the potential solution to thi s problem above, but it is worth addressing 
in somewhat greater detail. The key is that safeguards against opportunism have to be 
self-enforcing since legal enforcement is ruled out. 
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The traditional solution emphasized in the neoclassical literature is reputational 
effects. Most employers have to make frequent trips to the external market. Reputational 
effects are the first constraint on employer opportunism. Employers with reputations for 
treating their workers unfairly will find it difficult to recruit and maintain a qualified 
work force. Even if employees do not learn about an employer's reputation before hire, 
they will quickly learn it after being hired . Quit rates are very high in the first year of 
employment. Newly hired workers have made few investments in the job and lose rela-
tively little by quitting and searching for another job. Even firms with declining employ-
ment are subject to this check if they must replace some of their departing workers. 
The second check on employer opportunism is that dissatisfied employees can trigger 
their rights to organize and bargain collectively, thus replacing norms that are intended 
to be self-enforcing with legally enforceable contracts . This is a very powerful threat 
given that the newly unionized firm may find its labor costs increasing sharply (assum-
ing a standard union wage premium) . In a competitive, largely nonunionized industry, 
unionization may be fatal to the firm. It can be argued, given low rates of unionization 
in the private sector. that the threat to unionize is not much of a deterrent to employer 
opportunism. Perhaps that is true, but an employer would have to be highly risk tolerant 
to take that bet. 
The final deterrent against opportunism is the self-enforcing norms themselves . The 
literature on norms has identified the characteristics that are most likely to lead to suc-
cessful norm-based governance (Ellickson. 1991). Workable norms are joint profit maxi-
mizing. Since they are voluntary, they have to satisfy both parties . If norms with this 
characteristic can be developed, they are superior to contracts given the cost of contract 
writing and enforcement. This is particularly true in contracting over labor relations 
within a firm , where the frequency of interactions, the connectedness of events. and the 
evolutionary nature of the relationship make it impossible to write even a moderately 
complete contract. Fortunately, features that make contracting expensive in the ILM 
context are very similar to the factors identified by Ellickson as likely to give force to suc-
cessful norms-based enforcement, such as being part of a closely knit group. Therefore, 
in the ILM , norms governance has the potential to be very successful, while contract 
writing and enforcement will be very costly. 
In addition, Ellickson notes that the ability to apply sanctions is an important feature 
of norm governance. In the ILM, employees are empowered to apply sanctions by exer-
cising their ability to quit, as noted in the groundbreaking article by Gary Becker (1964), 
as well as by participating in negative gossip, which has become increasingly damaging in 
today 's Internet world. The employee's ability to apply sanctions in the ILM to deal with 
employer opportunism highlights the idea that ILMs are likely to generate self-enforcing 
employment norms that can ultimately trump contracting as a method of workplace 
governance. 
The primary point of the theory of the firm is that contract writing in the ILM is inef-
ficient. If it were efficient to contract over the terms of a particular activity, then it could 
be left to contracting in the external market, which benefits from the discipline and high-
powered incentives of market forces. The ILM is internal to the firm precisely because it 
is too costly to do otherwise. 
The point is underscored by the rising use of ''outsourcing" today, vvhich amounts to 
using the market to purchase labor services. Indeed , outsourcing of the labor function, 
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as an alternative to a union IlM , has become a major cost-cutting strategy, and thu s a 
major profit prod ucer for many firm s. Anything that significant ly increases the cost of 
employing union labor internally (such as judicial imposition of high contract enforce-
ment costs) increases the attractiveness of outso urcing. The nonunion firm rarely finds 
outsourcing attractive because its norm-based enforcement system is less expensive 
than wri ting a con tract with a firm that provides outsourcing la bor. The "make o r buy'' 
choice is a very ac tive area for decision making today regarding labor usage inside the 
firm . 
Hence, norms sta rt with a huge advantage over contract writing inside the firm. 
Beca use contract writ ing and enforcement are so cost ly and difficult , neither norms nor 
their enforcement have to be perfect ; they just have to ge t over that low bar to succeed. 
V. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
labor law and law and economics have not been close bedfellows. From one perspec-
tive, this is surprisin g. labor law is primari ly about nego tia ting a nd writing co llective 
ba rga ining contracts, and contract law quickly embraced law and economics when 
Richard Posner showed that important contract questions co uld be answered by apply-
ing eco nomic contract theory (Posner, 1973).:8 Similar ly, la bor law is abo ut one of the 
firm 's key inputs, la bo r, much as corporate law dea ls with another of its key inputs, 
capi ta l. Co rporate law found law and economics to be useful fo r thinking about rela-
tions between the firm and its so urces of capi ta l, yet labor law remains resistant to law 
and economics. 
The explana tion for the hos tility of labo r law to law and eco nomics is apparent. First, 
labo r law, unlike many areas of law. is inherentl y norma tive. The Wagner Act was itself 
pro-u nion and many of its supporters believed that unions wo uld become the dominant 
industria l rela tions sys tem . The law arguably became neutral between union and non-
union indust rial relations systems after the adoption of the Taft-Hartley Amendments, 
but labo r law scholarship retained its strong normative edge in favor of unions. M os t 
labor law scholars believe that co llec tive bargaining is the appropriate mecha nism fo r 
governing the empl oyment rela tionship for working men and women. 
The clash with law and economics was bound to be fierce. or at least spir ited. The basic 
find ing of labo r economics - uncontrove rsial in every o ther area of law a nd economics -
is tha t the quantity purchased of a good (e .g .. labor) varies inversely with it s price (e .g., 
wage). In labo r law, such an assertion is a cause for ba ttle, for it puts the central aims of 
the N LRA at odds with each o ther . The N LRA 's goa l of equalizing bargaining power 
wa s to be realized by workers joining uni ons, and by unions raising wages. H owever , 
mode rn labor economics teaches that if uni on wages are increased above market levels, 
union employment fall s. The goal is thu s internally inco nsistent. 
The union movement 's hope was that wages were to be taken out of competition, so 
th at the collec tive wage could be hi gher than the market wage . But thi s is unachieva ble 
in a competitive eco nomy with a significan t nonunio n sector. l abor cost differentials 
between union a nd nonunion firm s matter a grea t dea l. 
Over the past several decades, several attemp ts have been made to con trovert the con-
clusion that if unions, through co llect ive ba rgaining, force employers to pay more than 
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the market wage, union employment will decline. The efficiency wage theory sugges ted 
that if an empl oyer paid wo rkers an a bove marke t wage it could build a more loya l, 
experienced . a nd productive workforce. But if the high wage is to be a gift that calls forth 
greater productivity. it has to be given freely by the firm. In the context of collective bar-
gaining, the union is seen as securing the gains for the workers from recalcitrant manage-
ment: so in unionized fi rms, the workers· primary loyalty is likely to go to the union and 
not the firm . The efficiency wage story makes much better sense in the nonunion labor 
market. where the gift of the high wage can be claimed by management. After all. the 
etTiciency wage is simply another form of incentive payment which needs to be set by the 
employer at the level where the cost of the higher wage is equa l to the productivity benefit 
that results fr om the higher wage . 
T he empirical test of the efficiency wage claim for the unio n Ia bor market has pro-
duced negative results. A plethora of academic research fo und no positive rela tio nship 
between unions and productivity (Hirsch, Chapter 4 in this volume) . While u nions ra ise 
wages above competitive levels, there is no offsetting productivity effect. 
T raditional labor law scholars have tended to view the neoclassical model to be 
opposed to almost all policy improvements, even in the nonunion secto r. T here is much 
to this position, but the neoclassical model it self does allow for a number of po licy inter-
venti ons. T o begin with. measures tha t improve the functioning of markets (i.e ., that 
improve in fo rma ti on fl ows and aid mobility) are supported by neoclass ical economics. 
M oreover. given the problem of asymmetric information, modern neoclassical economic 
theory can support policy measures to improve occupa tional health (e.g ., OSHA) and 
the security of deferred compensation arrangements (e. g., ERISA) . Policy economists 
might disagree with each other as to whether specific regulati ons pass muster under 
benefit- cost analys is or whether the procedural element s are unnecessarily cos tl y, but, 
as a theoretical ma tter, the existence of information asymmetries can justify regul a to ry 
oversight. 
Regulati ons such as OSHA and ERISA, as well as the Fair Labor Standa rds Act, have 
ano ther feature that makes them acceptable to policy-oriented neoclassical economists: 
because they apply throughout the economy, they do not ca use cost discrepancies among 
union and nonunion firms. 
The a nti-intervention tilt of economic analysis comes back into fo rce when policies 
a ttempt to improve the lo t of workers by providing more procedural rights, such as 
res trictions on employment-at-will. Here, transaction cost theory is central. In par-
ticular , third-par ty enforcement of procedural rights inside the ILM is very costl y as 
described in this chapter. Process is expensive, especially if it involves third-pa rty review. 
Talk is not cheap. thus mandating more process is likely to lead to more out so urcing of 
the labor function . 
A broader question is whether traditional neoclass ical arguments miss the positive 
redistributional or welfare-enhancing effects of unions. This raises several complex 
cla ims. One is that , when labor unions raise wages, the effect is redistributional toward 
the bottom end of the income distribution. Putting aside the empirical question as to the 
position of uni on workers in the income distribution , neoclassical theory has a potent 
response. It tell s us that using unions to redistribute income is a bad idea. The fun da-
menta l theo rems of welfa re eco nomics tell policymakers to adopt policies th a t improve 
efficiency and then redist ribute income through taxes and government expendi tures. 
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Hence, even if unions have a positive effect on income distribution, those goals are better 
and more efficiently handled by other policy mechanisms. 
There remain , however, several critical areas for policy reform and welfare improve-
ment s. The fir st concerns laws to combat discrimination or to give special protection 
to certain vulnerable groups. Whether or not there is a strong efficiency case for such 
laws - there may be for some and not for others (Issacharoff and Scharff, Chapter 13 in 
this volume) - they may have strong welfare justifica tions beyond the scope of economic 
analys is. The second opening for reform is at the bottom of the labor market. In the 
nonunion sector, employers are encouraged to play by the rules because of reputational 
effects and the threat of unionization. But some employers are not deterred by these 
forces . Small employers and th ose who are on a path to go out of business are not as 
likely to be deterred, nor are employers who hire undocumented workers. For these 
workers , there is no back-stop even to prevent such core breakdowns as the nonpayment 
of wages for work performed . 
A more fundamental point involves the dist inction between normative and positive 
analys is noted above . Much of traditional labor reform is normative and a rticulates 
societal values or what commentators believe the va lues ought to be. Normative analysis 
is not antithetical to law and economics, nor does normative analysis pro vide a critique 
of the positive theory of the neoclassical model. The fundamental theorems of neoclassi-
cal economics, as discussed in the first section. recognize the existence of a social welfare 
function , which incorporates societal values. Economists, as economists, have little to 
say directly about the contours of the social welfare function . For example, many labor 
law scholars favor collective bargaining as a goal in itself. Expressed as a societal value, 
that is, as an input into the social welfare functi on, these positions are not open to the 
positive critique of the neoclassical model. 
At iss ue, however, is whether pro-union normative preferences are captured by the 
political economy that society has chosen. As stressed in Wachter (Chapter 15 in this 
volume), society's choice of a political eco nomy is more a political choice than an eco-
nomic one. The neoclassical model takes the political economy or the social welfare 
function as a given . It s analysis of the positive or negative effects of union pay premiums 
or o ther outcomes takes place in the co ntext of the accepted political economy. Today, 
the political economy of the United Sta tes is highly competitive. Hence, it is at this level 
that the normative argument in support of unions· traditional goals loses support. That 
unions cannot take wages out of competition is a consequence of society 's choice of a 
political economy that stresses free competition. 
NOTES 
l. The author gratefully acknowledges the contribution of the criticisms and suggestions made by 
Cynthia Estlund. Barry Hirsch, Bruce Kaufman. and Howard Lesnick . The author also thanks Natalie 
Ditomasso. Sarah Edelson and Marisa Kirio for research assistance . 
l The in itial text that started the debate in labor law was the first edition of Posner 's book, The Economic 
Anulrsis of L1111· ( 1973 ). 
3. See for e~ample Estlund (2003) . Gould (1993) . Stone (::'004) and Weiler (1984) For a traditionalist 
critique of the neoclassical model's applicat ion to l<:1bor bw, see Getman and Kohler ( 1983) and Verkuil 
( 1983) 
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4. This foll ows th e introductory treatment of labor markets. See. for example, Parkin (2012) For an 
intermediate-Je\·cl treatment. see Varian (2010). 
5. The neoclassical model was developed from earlier classica l models that came to similar conclusions. 
but in less complete or rigorous ways . Adam Smith ·s (! 776) was the most well known. Thomas Malthus 
( 1803) had a th eo ry of the labor market which predicted that wages would always be pushed to the sub-
sistence level because of the inability of individuals to control their fertility. More central to this chapter, 
Karl Marx ( 1867) had a theory that all value was created by labor an d thus could be returned to workers, 
presumably in the form of higher wages . His theory was contested by Bii hm-Bawerk ( 1889 ). who believed. 
co rrectly as it turned out. that savings was a form of postponed consumption and required a return (i nter-
est) in order to occur . If there were no return for savings, there would be little savings and littl e cap ital. 
The value of capital \\·as thus not embedded labor as Marx had theorized . 
6. See Katz and Rosen ( 1994), sta ting the first fundamental theorem: ·'As long as producers and consumers 
act as price takers and there is a market for every commodit y. the equilibrium a lloca tion of resources is 
Pare to efficient. That is , the economy operates at some point on the utility possibili ties frontie r. " 
7. See Katz and Rosen (! 994). stating the second fundamental theorem: "[P]rovided that all indiffe rence 
curves and isoq uants are convex at the origin. for each Pareto efficient alloca ti on of resources there is a 
set of prices that can attain that allocation as a general competitive equilibrium ... 
8. Labor economists are sometimes labeled as conservative because they di sfavor direct government 
intervention in specific markets. This is a misguided labeling from my perspective. Such individuals 
may well be very liberal overall but prefer that redistribution be achieved through tax and expenditure 
po licy . 
9. In a recent st udy Ashenfelter, Farber, and Ransom (2010) conclude that firms have some wage-setting or 
monopso ny power due to imperfect information and job differentiation. Although this line of research 
is just beginning, the prevailing assumption remains th at. except in the very short run, the amount of 
monopsony power available to firms is small and therefore unlikely to affect the conclusions reached in 
this chapter. 
10. For a standard microeconomic treatment of the union sector see Pa rkin (2012) for introductory treat-
ment. See Va rian (2010) for an intermediate-level trea tment affixing wages o r prices above compe titive 
levels. Union pay or total compensation consists of both the wage and nonwage benefits. For ease of 
exposition I use the term wage in place of tota l com pensation. 
II. Cartelization, although descriptive in economics. can be interpreted as pejorative in law. Cartelization is 
unlawful as a violation of the antitrust laws. Howeve r. the Clayton Act specifically provides a safe harbor 
for union ac ti vi ty. Consequently, as a semantic matter. if cartelization indicates unlawfu l an ti trust behav-
ior, then unions do not cartelize the labor market. To use carte lization pejoratively in the labo r co ntext 
thus requi res <l separate justification for why ca rtelizatio n is harmful. 
1:2. The Nationa l Labor Relations Act of 1935. spo nso red by Senator Rober t F. Wagner. is al so known 
widely as the Wagner Act. When I use the term Wagne r Act. I am referring to the Act as o riginally 
passed. When I refer to the NLRA, I am referrin g to the Act as amended , mos t importantly by the Labor 
Management Relations Act of 1947. popularly kn own as the Taft-Hart ley Act. 
13. The decline in union employment was, of course. due to a number of fact ors. For an accounting. see 
Farber and Western 0002). 
14. The version of Principii's of Economics used here was published in 1920: however the original version of 
the book was first published in 1890. 
15. The version of Th e Th eory of Wages used here was published in 1963 : however it contains an o rigina l 
reprint of the first edition of the book published in 1932. 
16. Indeed, although the economy has still not fully recovered from the financial crisis of 2008 and the result -
ing steep recession, arguably the wors t since the Great Depression. the evidence to da te is that wages have 
not only not declined, rather they have also continued to grow (Daly, Hobijn and Lucking. 2012). 
17. This is from the preamble to the Wagner Act: "The inequality ol' bargaining power between employees 
who do not possess full freedom of associati on or ac tual liberty of contract, and emplo ye rs who are 
organized in the corporate or other forms of ownershi p association substantiall y burdens and affects the 
fl ow of commerce. and tends to aggrava te recurrent business dep ressions, by de pressing wage rates and 
the purchasing power of wage earners in industry and by preven ting the stabi lization of competitive wage 
rates and working conditions within and between industries ... 
18. Moreover. between the passage of the Wagner Act and the Taft -Hartley Act. influential commentators 
such as Simons ( 1944) and Hayek (1944) had begun to question whethe r concentrated economic power. 
even in the hands of labor unions, was socially benellcial. 
19. See Henderson (2009) fo r a detailed description of the facts and sto ry behind the DOi(f!f r. Ford :Howr 
Compunr case. 
20. Dudg£: r Ford Morur Co .. 170 N. W. at 671. 
:21. This section draws heavily from Wachter and Wright ( 199U). 
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The economics literature on self-enforcing labor market co ntracts is extensive. See fo r example 
Carmichael ( 1989 ). Lazea r (2000). and Gibbons ( 1998) 
13. 
24 
See fo r example Eh renberg ( 1989) fo r a discussion of these issues. 
See Wi lliamson. Wachter. and Har ris (197 5) for a broader discussion of transaction costs in the ILM 
and the use of the term bounded rationality to desc ribe the difficulty of writing detailed contingent -state 
con tract s. 
25 Block ·s L,nv Dicrionwy (8th ed .. 2004. p. J41) de fines a contract as ··an agreement between two or more 
parties creating ob ligations tha t are enforceab le or otherwise recogn izable at law.·· 
26. Stone (2004) disagrees, claiming that. in the digital age. workers are exposed to a host of new cha llenges 
and insecurities. and thus unionism is more important now than it has e1·er been. Howewr. the problem 
is that ttnionism itself has ye t to ada pt to this new era . 
28. 
Wage rigidity refers specifically to wage rates . Workers who also rece ive bonuses or any other form of pay 
for performance will find their income vary in g with the size of the bonus or ot her pay for performance. 
As expected from the theory. fo r bonuses to work wel l they have to be based on informati on observable 
by the workers. A common technique is to base bon uses on firm -level income or o ther measures tha t are 
requi red as part of the firm·s fede ral filing req uirements under the Securities Exchan ge Act of 1934 as 
amended. 
The first edi tion of Posner's Economic Analrsis of Lm•· 11·as published in 1973. The latest edition is the 
eighth. which was published in 2011. 
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